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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Juan Ruben Gutierrez appeals from his conviction for unlawful possession of a
firearm.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
During a traffic stop, officers found Gutierrez, a previously convicted felon, in
possession of a ".45 caliber Ultra-Hi black powder pistol, a grinder that smelt of marijuana,
an empty bag that also smelled like marijuana and a Point Blank ballistic vest." (PSI, p.
4.) The state charged Gutierrez with one felony count of unlawful possession of a firearm
and one misdemeanor count of possession of paraphernalia. (R., pp. 16-17.) Gutierrez
moved to dismiss the felony count, contending the statute prohibiting felons from
possessing firearms was vague as to whether it included muzzle loading firearms. (R., pp.
36-37; Tr., p. 9, L. 10 - p. 10, L. 21.) He also moved for a jury instruction defining
"firearm" using a federal statutory definition excluding "antique" guns such as
muzzleloaders. (R., pp. 32-34.)
The prosecution objected to these motions, arguing that the statute gave notice that
it applied to "any" firearm, that the Idaho Code provided the applicable definition of
"firearm," and that Idaho had a pattern jury instruction that was not based on federal
statutes. (R., pp. 40-45, 4 7-51; Tr., p. 10, L. 23 - p. 12, L. 17 .)
The district court denied the motions, concluding that muzzle loading firearms are
included within the scope of the statute under the definition provided in the Idaho Code
and applicable case law. (Tr., p. 12, L 18 - p. 13, L. 10.)

1

Gutierrez thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to the unlawful possession
charge, preserving his right to appeal the district court's rulings on his motion to dismiss
and for a jury instruction based on the federal statute. (R., pp. 68-71; Tr., p. 15, L. 4-p.
24, L. 20.) The district court imposed a sentence of three years with one year determinate,
which it suspended and placed Gutierrez on probation. (R., pp. 77-79.) Gutierrez filed a
timely appeal from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 80-82.)

2

ISSUES
Gutierrez states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Gutierrez's motion to
dismiss Count I of the Information?

II.

Alternatively, did the district court err in denying Mr. Gutierrez's
motion for a specific jury instruction?

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
Has Gutierrez failed to show that a muzzle loading firearm is either not a firearm
or that he had no notice that a muzzle loading firearm is a firearm?
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ARGUMENT
Gutierrez Has Failed To Show That A Muzzle Loading Firearm Is Either Not A Firearm
Or That He Had No Notice That A Muzzle Loading Firearm Is A Firearm
A.

Introduction
The district court applied the definition of "firearm" statutorily applicable to the

charge, concluded it did not distinguish between muzzle loading firearms and other types
of firearms, and rejected Gutierrez's motions. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 3-10.) Gutierrez argues that
the statute is vague or, alternatively, that he was entitled to have the jury instructed with a
definition from a federal statute. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-13.) Because the Idaho Code
gives the term "firearm" a specific, clear definition applicable to the unlawful possession
statute, Gutierrez's arguments are without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
The Idaho appellate courts "exercise[] free review over questions of statutory

interpretation and application." State v. Thiel, 158 Idaho 103, 106, 343 P.3d 1110, 1113
(2015). "Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, courts give effect to
the statute as written, without engaging in statutory construction." In re Adoption of Doe,
156 Idaho 345,349, 326 P.3d 347, 351 (2014) (internal quotation omitted). "[C]laims that
criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague are reviewed de nova." State v. Cook, 165
Idaho 305, 444 P.3d 877, 881 (2019).

C.

The Term "Firearm" Is Given A Specific, Clear Definition Applicable To The
Unlawful Possession Statute
When this Court is presented a question of statutory interpretation, the statute is

"considered as a whole, and words are given their plain, usual, and ordinary meanings."
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State v. Wilson, 165 Idaho 64, 438 P.3d 302, 305 (2019) (internal quotation omitted).
"Statutory interpretation that turns on '[l]egislative definitions of terms included within a
statute' presents a straight-forward analysis, as those definitions 'control and dictate the
meaning of those terms as used in the statute.'" In Re Decision on Joint Motion to Certify
Question of Law to Idaho Supreme Court (Dkt. 31, 32, 45), 165 Idaho 298,444 P.3d 870,
874 (2018) (brackets original, quoting State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 477, 163 P.3d
1183, 1189 (2007)).
Idaho Code section 18-3316(1), the unlawful possession statute, prohibits any
person previously convicted of a felony from possessing "any firearm." "'Firearm"' for
purposes of chapter 33 of title 18 (including 18-3316) "means any weapon that will, is
designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive."
LC. § 18-3302(2)(d). 1 The district court properly concluded that nothing in this definition
of "firearm" would exempt muzzle loading firearms.

(Tr., p. 13, Ls. 3-1 0; see also State

v. Dolsby, 143 Idaho 352, 353-55, 145 P.3d 917, 918-20 (Ct. App. 2006) (Dolsby's
mistaken belief that it was legal for him to possess a muzzle loading firearm not a defense).)
The void-for-vagueness doctrine "requires that a statute defining criminal conduct
be worded with sufficient clarity and definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and that the statute be worded in a manner that does not allow
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." State v. Cook, 165 Idaho 305, 444 P.3d 877,
881 (2019) (internal quotation omitted). Here Gutierrez was on notice that he could not
legally possess "any firearm," LC. § 18-3316(1), defined as "any weapon that will, is

1

This definition of"firearm" was adopted in 2015 in the same legislation that repealed the
previous definition contained in LC.§ 18-3316. 2015 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 303, pp. 118889, 1198.
5

designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive,"
LC. § 18-3302(d). Because a muzzle loaded, black powder, .45 caliber pistol is plainly
within the definition of a weapon that will and was designed to expel a projectile by the
action of an explosive, Gutierrez was on ample notice that his conduct was prohibited.
Gutierrez argues there is an "ambiguity created by the lack of a definition for the
term 'firearm"' that makes the statute "vague as applied" to him and allowing officers "to
arbitrarily and discriminatorily enforce our penal laws."

(Appellant's brief, p. 8.)

Gutierrez's claim that there is a "lack of a definition for the term 'firearm"' is false,
however. LC. § 18-3302(2)(d). Because his argument is based on a false premise, it fails.
Nor was Gutierrez entitled to a jury instruction based on a federal statute defining
the term "firearm." It goes almost without saying that jury instructions should "state the
applicable law." State v. Bodenbach, 165 Idaho 577,448 P.3d 1005, 1013 (2019) (internal
quotation omitted). Thus, the jury instruction providing a definition of the term "firearm"
should reflect the definition the Idaho legislature adopted, LC. § 18-3302(2)(d), not a
definition from a federal statute never intended to apply to the charging statute.
Gutierrez argues the federal definition of "firearm" is correct because it is
incorporated in LC. § 18-3302D(2)(b), which should be applied to LC. § 18-3316 under
the rule of lenity.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-13.)

However, LC. § 18-3302D(2)(b),

prohibiting firearms on school grounds, provides definitions "[a]s used in this section."
LC. § 18-3302D(2). The federal definition of "firearm" is therefore incorporated only into
the crime of bringing a firearm onto school grounds. Gutierrez was charged under a
different section prohibiting convicted felons from possessing firearms, LC. § 18-3316.
(R., pp. 16-17.) The definition applicable to Chapter 33 of Title 18, LC.§ 18-3302(2) ("As
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used in this chapter ... "), applied to Gutierrez's conduct. The applicable definition of
"firearm" is "any weapon that will, is designed to, or may readily be converted to expel a
projectile by the action of an explosive." LC. § 18-3302(2)(d). Gutierrez has not shown
he was entitled to a jury instruction providing a definition antithetical to the one provided
by the Idaho legislature.
The district court correctly applied the legislative definition of "firearm" and
rejected Gutierrez's contentions that whether Gutierrez could legally possess a muzzle
loading firearm was vague and that Gutierrez was entitled to a jury instruction generally
excluding muzzle loaded firearms. Gutierrez has failed to show error.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 25th day of March, 2020.

/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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